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Abstract In a series of recent works, Kit Fine (2003, 2007) has sketched a
novel solution to Frege’s puzzle. Radically departing from previous solutions,
Fine argues that Frege’s puzzle forces us to reject compositionality. In this
paper we first provide an explicit formalization of the relational semantics
for first-order logic suggested, but only briefly sketched, by Fine. We then
show why the relational semantics alone is technically inadequate, forcing Fine
to enrich the syntax with a coordination schema. Given this enrichment, we
argue, that that the semantics is compositional. We then examine the deep
consequences of this result for Fine’s proposed solution to Frege’s puzzle. We
argue that Fine has mis-diagnosed his own solution–his attempted solution
does not deny compositionality. The correct characterization of Fine’s solution
fits him more comfortably among familiar solutions to the puzzle.
Keywords Frege’s puzzle · proper names · Compositionality · Semantic
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In a series of recent works, Kit Fine (2003, 2007) has sketched a novel solution
to Frege’s puzzle. The novelty is itself surprising and exciting given the minimal
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resources with which the puzzle is posed. Frege (1892) claimed that sentences
differing by the substitution of coreferential proper names such as (1) and
(2) differ semantically, arguing that (2) expresses a valuable extension of our
knowledge, while (1) doesn’t.
(1) Cicero is Cicero.
(2) Cicero is Tully.
The difference shows up in more complex sentences as well: attitude ascriptions
differing by the substitution of one name for the other may even have different
truth-values.
(3) Sam believes that Cicero is Cicero.
(4) Sam believes that Cicero is Tully.
Assuming that the meaning of a name is its referent, this would entail that
the members of each pair semantically differ even though they differ only by
the substitution of synonymous terms. This conflicts with the principle that
meaning is compositional. Focussing on the simple sentences, the conflict can
be brought out as a tension between the following claims:
difference: (1) and (2) differ semantically.
compositionality: If sentences (1) and (2) differ only by the substitu-
tion of constituents which are semantically the same, then (1) and (2) are
semantically the same.
minimal pair: Sentences (1) and (2) differ only by the substitution of ‘Ci-
cero’ for ‘Tully’—all other inputs to semantic evaluation coincide.
synonymy: ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ are semantically the same.
The typical menu of solutions either outright rejects difference (e.g., Salmon
1986, Soames 1987) or posits that the meaning of a name goes beyond its
referent, thereby rejecting synonymy (e.g., Frege 1892, Chalmers 2002). In
the case of attitude ascriptions, it is also popular to reject that (3) and (4) are
a minimal pair (e.g. Crimmins and Perry 1989 and Schiffer 1992).
Radically departing from previous solutions, Fine argues that the culprit
is compositionality.
Current philosophical thinking on Frege’s puzzles has reached an im-
passe, with strong theoretical arguments in favor of [difference] and
strong intuitive arguments in favor of [synonymy] and yet no appar-
ent way to choose between them. And this suggests that we should
perhaps take more seriously the possibility of rejecting the assumption
of [compositionality] that puts them in conflict. (Fine 2007: 35)
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compositionality is a deep seated assumption and guiding principle in se-
mantic theorizing, but Fine argues that its rejection is mandatory on account
of a puzzle paralleling Frege’s, which Fine dubs the antinomy of the vari-
able. The puzzle is that open sentences (5) and (6) differ semantically, even
though—Fine alleges—‘x’ and ‘y’ are semantically the same.
(5) Rxx
(6) Rxy
Specifically, (5) and (6) embed differently: ∃x∃yRxxmay be false while ∃x∃yRxy
is true. The puzzle is then structurally similar to our original puzzle.
difference: (5) and (6) differ semantically.
compositionality: If formulae (5) and (6) differ only by the substitution
of constituents which are semantically the same, then (5) and (6) are se-
mantically the same.
minimal pair: Formulae (5) and (6) differ only by the substitution of ‘x’
for ‘y’—all other inputs to semantic evaluation coincide.
synonymy: ‘x’ and ‘y’ are semantically the same.
The synonymy claim is motivated by Fine’s suggestion that the difference
between ‘x’ and ‘y’ is merely “notational”, and thus their semantic roles should
be the same: “It is not as if the variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ have a special ‘x’-sense
or ‘y’-sense” (Fine 2007: 38).1
According to Fine, the only reasonable solution to this parallel puzzle is to
deny compositionality.
We must allow that any two variables will be semantically the same,
even though pairs of identical and of distinct variables are semantically
different; and we should, in general, be open to the possibility that the
meaning of the expressions of a language is to be given in terms of their
semantic relationships to one another. (Fine 2007: 24)
Fine roughly outlines a non-compositional semantics for first-order logic in-
corporating the following principle.
1 The antinomy of the variable and the claim of synonymy is admittedly subtle. It won’t
matter for our project here whether or not synonymy is well-motivated, what matters is
how Fine solves the apparent antinomy, and what lessons he draws about Frege’s puzzle.
Ultimately, we think the best—perhaps only—way to make sense of the antinomy is in terms
of structured meanings (or at least in terms of some fine-grained notion of meaning), whereby
if two syntactically isomorphic sentences are synonymous (e.g. ∀xFx and ∀yFy ), then they
must have corresponding constituents which are synonymous. Given this it follows that ‘x’
and ‘y’ must be synonymous. See Pickel and Rabern (2016) for a detailed discussion the
antinomy framed in these terms and a resolution of the problem within a broadly Tarskian
framework.
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relationism: The truth conditions of a sentence are not determined by the
semantic features of its constituents in isolation, but instead determined by
the semantic relationships that hold among the sequence of its constituents
as a whole.
The relationist semantics for variables is meant to create space for a similar
rejection of compositionality in the case of proper names. Fine’s proposed
solution has taken its place among the rival solutions to Frege’s puzzle. Propo-
nents and critics have focussed on the extension of the relationist semantics to
names (see, e.g. Soames 2010, Salmon 2012, Cumming 2014, and Pryor 2016).
But we are skeptical about the underlying semantics for variables. Even
granting that the antinomy is a real puzzle—that ‘x’ and ‘y’ agree semantically—
we deny that Fine’s approach, on its own terms, mandates the rejection of
compositionality for variables. Specifically, the relationist semantics on its
own is inadequate. In order to repair it, Fine introduces additional complica-
tions: he enriches the input to the semantics.
enriched representation: The input to semantics must be enriched
with patterns of coordination between occurrences of variables. We can
think if these patterns of coordination “as lines connecting one occurrence
of the variable to another—as in the familiar ‘telegraphic’ notation for
quantifier binding” (Fine 2007: 30).2
The incorporation of an additional input, a coordination scheme, is often taken
to be a critical component of Fine’s non-compositional, relationist semantics.
We will argue, however, that relationism and enriched representation
are actually in conflict: positing the latter makes the former unnecessary. By
enriching the input to semantics, Rxx and Rxy are no longer a minimal pair,
differing only by the substitution of variables ‘x’ and ‘y’. Therefore there is no
threat to compositionality.
In the following, we first provide an explicit formalization of the relational
semantics for first-order logic suggested, but only briefly sketched, in Fine
(2003: 623-629; 2007: 25-32). We then show why the relational semantics alone
is technically inadequate, forcing Fine to enrich the syntax with a coordination
schema. Given this enrichment, we argue that the semantics is (weakly) com-
positional. We then examine the deep consequences of this result for Fine’s
proposed solution to Frege’s puzzle. Fine’s solution to the puzzle can only
be properly assessed when we appreciate which of the inconsistent claims he
rejects. Specifically, in the case of Frege’s puzzle, Fine also relies on coordina-
tion schema as extra inputs to the semantics. Thus, Fine’s solution is not to
deny compositionality but instead to deny that (1) and (2) are minimal
2 Fine is alluding to Quine (1940/1981: 69-70) who suggested that relations of variable
binding be represented using “quantificational diagrams”, where lines or “bonds” connect
quantifiers to the positions in predicates that they bind. This idea was echoed in Kaplan
(1986: 244), who connects it to Frege’s syntax whereby “variables” (i.e. German letters) are
merely typographic parts of the quantifier sign serving to link the concavity to the relevant
“gaps” in predicates.
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pairs differing only by the substitution of co-referential proper names. There-
fore, Fine has mis-diagnosed his own solution. The correct characterization
of Fine’s solution fits him more comfortably among familiar solutions to the
puzzle.
1 Relationism
Fine’s relationism denies compositionality. Expressions α and β may agree
semantically, though composite expressions φα and φβ differing only by the
substitution of an occurrence of α for and occurrence of β semantically differ.
The relationship between α and the other components of φα may generate
semantic effects different from the relationship between β and the other com-
ponents of φβ . To implement this idea, Fine proposes to evaluate a composite
expression in terms of the semantic connection on the sequence of expressions
composing it. The semantic connection on a sequence of expressions is the
sequence of values that those expressions are capable of jointly assuming (in
that order). The sequence corresponding to φα may contain multiple occur-
rences of α, which are semantically mandated to assume the same value. The
sequence which results from substituting an occurrence of α for β may have
a different semantic connection, since an occurrence of α may not be required
to assume the same value as an occurrence of β.
To handle the semantics of first-order logic, Fine considers the semantic
connection on a sequence of variables. This generalizes the notion of a do-
main for a variable. The domain D of a single variable is the set of values
that it can assume. The “domain” of a pair of variables 〈x, y〉 is the set of
sequences of values that the variables are simultaneously capable of assum-
ing: {〈d1, d2〉 | d1, d2 ∈ D}. The idea generalizes to any sequence of simple
expressions: the “domain” of a sequence of simple expressions is the set of
sequences of values that the expressions are simultaneously capable of assum-
ing. Defining the semantic connection on any sequence of simple expressions
of the language provides the “lexical” or base semantics in terms of which the
semantic connections on complex expressions is defined. The semantic connec-
tion on any complex expression is defined in terms of the semantic connection
on its syntactic constituents when taken in sequence.
The idea is to define what values (true or false) the sentence ‘x+y = y+x’
may assume in terms of what values the expressions composing the sequence
〈x,+, y,=, y,+, x〉 may assume when taken in that sequence. The sequence
〈x,+, y,=, y,+, x〉 may assume the value 〈7,+, 3,=, 3,+, 7〉, but not the value
〈7,+, 3,=, 2,+, 2〉. Given a definition of ‘+’ and ‘=’ in conjunction with the
semantic connection on its simple constituents would yield that ‘x+y = y+x’
can only assume the value truth. In this way one can recursively define the
truth (and falsity) conditions of sentences in terms the generalized notion of
a “domain” (i.e. in terms of semantic connections).
Notice that the semantic connection on the pairs 〈x, y〉 and 〈x, x〉 are
distinct—{〈d1, d2〉 | d1, d2 ∈ D} and {〈d, d〉 | d ∈ D}, respectively—even
6 Bryan Pickel, Brian Rabern
though the semantic connection on ‘x’ and ‘y‘ themselves are the same. Thus
the semantic connections on the pairs of variables are not grounded in the
semantic connections on their members. Fine claims that this rejection of
compositionality is the key to solving the antinomy:
[The relational semantics] embodies a solution to the antinomy: the
intrinsic semantic features of x and y (as given by the degenerate se-
mantic connections on those variables) are the same, though the intrin-
sic semantic features of the pairs x, y and x, x (again, as given by the
semantic connections on those pairs) are different. (Fine 2007: 31-2)
In the next section, we formally implement Fine’s relationist idea that the
semantic features of a composite expression should be evaluated in terms of
semantic connections on their component expressions taken in sequence.
1.1 The semantics
Assume the syntax is standard. For any sequence of variables α1, . . . , αn drawn
from {xi}i∈N and any n-place predicate pin ∈ {Fni }i,n∈N the well-formed sen-
tences of the language are provided by the following grammar:3
φ ::= pinα1 . . . αn | ¬φ | (φ ∧ φ) | ∀αφ
As usual the other connectives, such as →,∨, ∃, etc., be introduced as abbre-
viations, if desired.
Let a model A = 〈D, I〉, where D is a (non-empty) domain of individuals,
and I is an interpretation for the predicates, which assigns sets of ordered
n-tuples of individuals to the n-place predicates. And let {0, 1} be the set of
truth-values. The semantics will not require relativization to an assignment of
values to variables (in the style of Tarski 1936), since the semantic connection
on a formula is defined in part in terms of the semantic connection on its
variables taken in sequence, and the base clause of the semantics specifies the
semantic connection on any sequence of variables. In order to streamline the
exposition we’ll introduce a convention concerning concatenation of sequences.
Definition. For sequences σ = 〈a1, . . . , ai〉 and τ = 〈b1, . . . , bj〉 such that
i, j ≥ 1, let (σ, τ) = 〈a1, . . . , ai, b1, . . . , bj〉.
This operation requires a few typographical remarks.
Remark 1: We omit brackets on 1-membered sequences, so if a is not a
sequence, we abbreviate (σ, a) = (σ, 〈a〉).
3 We provide the formation rules using a version of the convenient Backus-Naur notation.
The interpretation is clear, but for purists note that we use α, pin, and φ for metavariables
instead of defining, say, 〈variable〉, 〈n-place predicate〉, and 〈sentence〉.
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Remark 2: The operation (. . . , . . .) is associative, so we abbreviate (σ, τ, υ)
= (σ, (τ, υ)) = ((σ, τ), υ).
Remark 3: When occurring inside denotation brackets we will omit the
round brackets so for example Jσ, τK = J(σ, τ)K.
As we have said, Fine semantically evaluates an expression in terms of the
semantic connection, J.K, on its constituents taken in sequence, where the se-
mantic connection is the sequence of values they are capable of jointly as-
suming. The complex expression is said to “give way to” the sequence of its
constituents expressions whose semantic connection determines the possible
values of the complex expression. In order to recursively implement this idea,
one must define the contribution of an expression χ of arbitrary complexity to
the semantic connection on a sequence (Σ,χ, Υ ) that contains χ. A formula
will be true (relative to a model A) when the sequence consisting of just that
formula assumes only the value 1 (and false when it only assumes the value
0). That is, for all formulae φ and models A:
truth: φ is true (in A) iff JφK = {1}
falsity: φ is false (in A) iff JφK = {0}
With these definitions in place we provide the following recursive specification
of the semantic connection on a sequence including a formula (relative to a
model A) in terms of the semantic connection on the sequence of expressions it
gives way to. The base clause specifies the semantic connection on any sequence
of variables:
variables: Jα1, . . . , αnK = {〈d1, . . . , dn〉 ∈ Dn | di = dj if αi = αj }
Since formulae can assume only the values 0 and 1 (and open formulae can as-
sume both values), the semantic connection on a sequence containing a formula
contains only the following sequences of values:
atomic:
• (σ, 1, υ) ∈ JΣ, piα1 . . . αk, Υ K iff for some τ such that (σ, τ, υ) ∈ JΣ,α1, . . . , αk, Υ K,
τ ∈ I(pi)
• (σ, 0, υ) ∈ JΣ, piα1 . . . αk, Υ K iff for some τ such that (σ, τ, υ) ∈ JΣ,α1, . . . , αk, Υ K,
τ /∈ I(pi)
negation:
• (σ, 1, υ) ∈ JΣ,¬φ, Υ K iff (σ, 0, υ) ∈ JΣ,φ, Υ K
• (σ, 0, υ) ∈ JΣ,¬φ, Υ K iff (σ, 1, υ) ∈ JΣ,φ, Υ K
conjunction:
• (σ, 1, υ) ∈ JΣ, (φ ∧ ψ), Υ K iff (σ, 1, 1, υ) ∈ JΣ,φ, ψ, Υ K
• (σ, 0, υ) ∈ JΣ, (φ ∧ ψ), Υ K iff (σ,m, n, υ) ∈ JΣ,φ, ψ, Υ K, where m = 0 or
n = 0
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quantification:
• (σ, 1, υ) ∈ JΣ,∀αφ, Υ K iff (σ, d, 1, υ) ∈ JΣ,α, φ, Υ K, for all d ∈ D
• (σ, 0, υ) ∈ JΣ,∀αφ, Υ K iff (σ, d, 0, υ) ∈ JΣ,α, φ, Υ K, for some d ∈ D
Thus we’ve defined the semantic connection on any formula in terms of the
semantic connection on its syntactic constituents when taken in sequence (rel-
ative to a model A). For example, a formula such as ∀x(Fx ∧ Gx) can be
semantically evaluated as follows.
1 ∈ J∀x(Fx ∧Gx)K iff (d, 1) ∈ Jx, (Fx ∧Gx)K, for all d ∈ D
iff (d, 1, 1) ∈ Jx, Fx,GxK, for all d ∈ D
iff for some a such that (d, a, 1) ∈ Jx, x,GxK, a ∈ I(F ), for all d ∈ D
iff for some a and some b such that (d, a, b) ∈ Jx, x, xK, a ∈ I(F ) and b ∈ I(G), for all d ∈ D
iff for all d ∈ D, d ∈ I(F ) and d ∈ I(G) (since Jx, x, xK = {(e, e, e) | e ∈ D})
A similar derivation would show that 0 ∈ J∀x(Fx∧Gx)K just in case for some
d ∈ D either d /∈ I(F ) or d /∈ I(G). It can easily be proved that relative to a
model, J∀x(Fx ∧ Gx)K = {1} or J∀x(Fx ∧ Gx)K = {0}. Thus, the formula is
either true or false, as will be any closed formula.
1.2 Relationism and compositionality
The semantics thus presented seems to deliver the results Fine desires. Ex-
cepting an issue to be discussed in the next section, the semantics appears to
deliver the right truth conditions for formulae of first-order logic. Moreover,
the semantic interpretation of a variable will be the semantic connection on
the variable itself, thus JxK = JyK. Yet, the semantic connection on Rxy and
Rxx may differ, since Jx, yK 6= Jx, xK.
As Fine (2007: 26) notes the semantic value of a composite expression is
not a function of the semantic values of its constituents (either immediate or
terminal) and the mode of combination of these values. Therefore, his seman-
tics denies compositionality and its usual generalizations as strong or weak
compositionality. Let µ be the syntactic mode of combination. Then, strong
and weak compositionality can be formulated as follows (cf. the definitions in
Pagin and Westerst˚ahl 2010):
strong compositionality: If φ = µ(φ1, . . . , φn) and ψ = µ(ψ1, . . . , ψn)
and if φi and ψi are semantically the same for all i (that is, JφiK = JψiK),
then φ and ψ are semantically the same.
weak compositionality: If φ = µ(φ1, . . . , φn) and ψ = µ(ψ1, . . . , ψn)
where each φi and ψi is a terminal syntactic constituent and if φi and ψi
are semantically the same for all i (that is, JφiK = JψiK), then φ and ψ are
semantically the same.
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The relational semantics above is not even weakly compositional because com-
plex expressions are semantically different even though they differ only by
substituting terminal syntactic constituents which are semantically the same.
In fact, Fine only secures a significantly weaker principle.
relational dependence: If φ = µ(φ1, . . . , φn) and ψ = µ(ψ1, . . . , ψm)
and if the sequences of expressions φ1, . . . , φn and ψ1, . . . , ψm are seman-
tically the same (that is, Jφ1, . . . , φnK = Jψ1, . . . , ψmK), then φ and ψ are
semantically the same
The semantic evaluation of a complex expression will be a function of the
semantic values of its complex expressions plus relations among the expressions
themselves rather than their values.
In semantics the principle of compositionality is often taken as both a
guiding methodological hypothesis and a theoretical posit (see Partee 1984).
The explanatory motivation stems from considerations of semantic productiv-
ity. A language user can semantically evaluate infinitely many novel complex
expressions, because the meanings of the complex expressions are a function
of the semantic values of their constituents. It is an open question whether the
weaker relationist principle can fill the explanatory role of the compositionality
principles. Fine can explain why a language user can understand a complex ex-
pression in terms of that language user’s knowledge of the semantic connection
on the sequence of simpler expressions that compose the complex expression.
But the language user’s knowledge of this semantic connection does not arise
from her understanding of the semantic features of the simple expressions in
the sequence. Explanation comes to an end at a language user’s knowledge of
a semantic connection on a sequence of expressions.
2 Enriched representation
Relationism alone introduces semantic ills, which are far worse than the
antimony itself. In particular, it mandates that every occurrence of the same
variable type co-varies. Fine mentions that free occurrence of a variable will be
forced to assume the same values as bound occurrences of the same variable.
Consider the sentence ∃xFx ∧ Gx. In this sentence, the quantifier ‘∃x’ has
scope over the formula Fx but not over Gx. Thus, ‘x’ as it occurs in Gx is
free. Yet, on the semantics developed so far, the free occurrence is coordinated
with the bound occurrence. Specifically, ∃xFx ∧ Gx is true just in case for
some (d, d, d) ∈ Jx, x, xK, d ∈ I(F ) and d ∈ I(G). Thus, the sentence will be
true just in case there exists something which is both F and G. As a result,
the sentence has the same truth conditions as ∃x(Fx∧Gx). As Fine (2007: 31)
observes, this is the familiar “dynamic” reading of the sentence ∃xFx∧Gx—for
example, in dynamic predicate logic where an existential quantifier can have
binding effects beyond its syntactic scope (Groenendijk and Stokhof 1991). As
such, this might not be viewed as disaster, but rather as Fine suggests “a great
virtue of the approach” (ibid.: 31).
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But more troubling results follow. For instance, it is far less plausible to
say that ∀xFx ∧Gx ever has the same truth conditions as ∀x(Fx ∧Gx). The
most telling difficulty, not discussed by Fine, is that multiple occurrences of a
variable bound by distinct quantifiers in a formula such as ∃xFx∧∃x¬Fx will
be forced to assume the same values. Normally, one would want ∃xFx∧∃x¬Fx
to be true just in case there is an entity which is F and a (distinct) entity which
is not F . But on the semantics so far, ∃xFx∧∃x¬Fx will have the same truth
conditions as the logical falsehood ∃x(Fx∧¬Fx), which says that there exists
a single entity which is both F and not F . The derivation runs as follows:
1 ∈ J∃xFx ∧ ∃x¬FxK iff (1, 1) ∈ J∃xFx,∃x¬FxK
iff (d1, 1, 1) ∈ Jx, Fx,∃x¬FxK, for some d1 ∈ D
iff (d1, d2, 1) ∈ Jx, x,∃x¬FxK, d2 ∈ I(F ), for some d1, d2 ∈ D
iff (d1, d2, d3, 1) ∈ Jx, x, x,¬FxK, d2 ∈ I(F ), for some d1, d2, d3 ∈ D
iff (d1, d2, d3, 0) ∈ Jx, x, x, FxK, d2 ∈ I(F ), for some d1, d2, d3 ∈ D
iff (d1, d2, d3, d4) ∈ Jx, x, x, xK, d2 ∈ I(F ) and d4 /∈ I(F ), for some d1, d2, d3, d4 ∈ D
iff for some d ∈ D, d ∈ I(F ) and d /∈ I(F ) (since Jx, x, x, xK = {(e, e, e, e) | e ∈ D}).
Thus, the formula (∃xFx ∧ ∃x¬Fx) cannot assume the value true.
There is no way to count this result as a virtue. Fine needs be able to dif-
ferentiate the contributions of distinct occurrences of the same variable. To do
so, Fine introduces additional semantic inputs: a coordination relation among
variables, which one could represent with linking “wires” as follows:
∃xFx ∧ ∃x¬Fx
The coordination relations restrict which occurrences of the same variable type
must be co-interpreted in the semantic connection.
The change here is monumental. The relational semantics, as developed in
the previous section, effectively reads the coordination off of the “logical struc-
ture” of the sentence. A variable’s two-fold occurrence in a sequence dictated
that the corresponding positions in the semantic connection on the sequence
take coordinated values. This allowed for the possibility that a minimal pair
such as Rxx and Rxy, differing only in the substitution of an occurrence of ‘x‘
for ‘y‘, may differ semantically. The substitution of ‘x‘ for ‘y‘ does not preserve
the overall logical structure of the sentence.
However, the suggestion now is that we impose a coordination scheme as an
extra input to semantic evaluation. The immediate result is that Rxx and Rxy
do not—in themselves—differ semantically. A difference only arises when we
evaluate Rxx in conjunction with a coordination scheme c which associates
the two occurrence of ‘x’.4 Fine (2003: 628) conceives of the coordination
scheme as syntactic in nature, not a semantic parameter: “the syntactic object
of evaluation will no longer be a sequence of expressions but a coordinated
4 This point is also pressed by Hovda (2010: 506).
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sequence of expressions”. Thus, the syntactic input to semantic evaluation is
enriched. Our implementation in the semantics below, however, will be neutral
as to whether the coordination schema is an addition to the syntactic structure
(or more generally the linguistic representation), or as a semantic parameter
against which the sentence is processed. (This is partially with an eye towards
Frege’s puzzle where it is less plausible to introduce a syntactic coordination
relation among distinct occurrences of the same name.)
2.1 Coordination
Since we are no longer semantically evaluating a formula or sequence of ex-
pressions alone, but only in conjunction with a coordination schema, we need
to supplement the semantics. Again, one might take this coordination schema
as an additional syntactic input, a syntactic relation among occurrences of a
given expression. Or, one might take the coordination schema as a semantic
input against which a formula is processed. Our approach will leave the coor-
dination schema unanalyzed; we are only investigating the logical properties
it must have. To do so, we represent the semantic connection on a sequence
of expressions α1, . . . , αn relative to a coordination scheme c as Jα1, . . . , αnKc.
The coordination scheme c itself is meant to determine a relation among oc-
currences of expressions in a formula or sequence of formulas.
Formally, a coordination scheme is an equivalence relation on the free
occurrences of variables in the sequence, subject to the requirement
that it only relate occurrences of the same variable. (Fine 2007: 30)
The occurrences of an expression in a sequence can be associated with their
numerical positions in the sequence. So formally, an equivalence relation on
occurrences in an n-membered sequence α1, . . . αn of expressions can be mod-
eled as an equivalence relation c on the numbers in {1, ..., n}. For the purposes
of the semantics of variables, Fine himself imposes the additional requirement
that c(i, j) holds only if αi = αj . The motivation seems to be that it should be
impossible for ‘∃y’ to bind the occurrence of ‘x’ in ∃yFx, though once coordi-
nation is introduced, we don’t see a principled reason why this binding should
be prohibited.5
5 Fine suggests that the syntactic object of evaluation will not be a formula, but a pair
consisting of a formula and a coordination schema which relates occurrences of the same
variable. So construed, ‘Fxx’ under schema c = {〈1, 1〉, 〈1, 2〉, 〈2, 1〉, 〈2, 2〉} is a proper input
to semantic evaluation whereas ‘Fxy’ under schema c is not (in other words ‘Fxy’ with a wire
linking ‘x’ and ‘y’ is simply ill-formed). But once the coordination schema are introduced
sameness and distinctness of variables becomes redundant—one might as well just have
the variable or gaps. Many theories that make use of “wire diagrams” or coordination
schema, in fact, simply dispense with having variables at all. As we see it either binding is
enforced by wire diagram (i.e. coordination) or it is enforced by sameness of variable (i.e.
co-indexing). Thus, we implement the semantics in a way that allows genuine coordination
between distinct variables. This implementation is also motivated by looking forward to
Fine’s treatment of names, where Fine is explicit that distinct expressions such as names
and anaphoric pronouns can be genuinely coordinated. Thanks to Kyle Hammet Blumberg
and Harvey Lederman for pressing us to clarify this subtle issue.
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With this terminology in place, the semantics basically follows the seman-
tics above.
variables: Jα1, . . . , αnKc = {〈d1, . . . , dn〉 ∈ Dn | di = dj iff c(i, j)}
atomic:
• (σ, 1, υ) ∈ JΣ, piα1 . . . αk, Υ Kc iff for some τ such that (σ, τ, υ) ∈ JΣ,α1, . . . , αk, Υ Kc,
τ ∈ I(pi)
• (σ, 0, υ) ∈ JΣ, piα1 . . . αk, Υ Kc iff for some τ such that (σ, τ, υ) ∈ JΣ,α1, . . . , αk, Υ Kc,
τ /∈ I(pi)
negation:
• (σ, 1, υ) ∈ JΣ,¬φ, Υ Kc iff (σ, 0, υ) ∈ JΣ,φ, Υ Kc
• (σ, 0, υ) ∈ JΣ,¬φ, Υ Kc iff (σ, 1, υ) ∈ JΣ,φ, Υ Kc
conjunction:
• (σ, 1, υ) ∈ JΣ, (φ ∧ ψ), Υ Kc iff (σ, 1, 1, υ) ∈ JΣ,φ, ψ, Υ Kc
• (σ, 0, υ) ∈ JΣ, (φ ∧ ψ), Υ Kc iff (σ,m, n, υ) ∈ JΣ,φ, ψ, Υ Kc, where m = 0
or n = 0
quantification:
• (σ, 1, υ) ∈ JΣ,∀αφ, Υ Kc iff (σ, d, 1, υ) ∈ JΣ,α, φ, Υ Kc, for all d ∈ D
• (σ, 0, υ) ∈ JΣ,∀αφ, Υ Kc iff (σ, d, 0, υ) ∈ JΣ,α, φ, Υ Kc, for some d ∈ D
As we have observed, the core difference here lies in the semantic connections
on sequences of variables. Whereas the simple relationist semantics coordi-
nates any two occurrences of ‘x’ in a sequence, the supplemented semantics
coordinates occurrences of ‘x’ only if they are related by the coordination
relation.
The semantics repairs the problem with the formula ∃xFx ∧ ∃x¬Fx. On
its own, no occurrences of ‘x’ in the formula are coordinated. Thus, neither
occurrence of the quantifier ‘∃x’ binds any variables in its scope, making the
(uncoordinated) formula equivalent to ∃xFy ∧ ∃z¬Fw. However, the formula
can also be enriched with a coordination scheme that relates occurrences of
the variable ‘x’. The desired coordination scheme is as above:
∃xFx ∧ ∃x¬Fx
The coordination scheme c then relates the first and second occurrences of
‘x’ and the third and forth occurrences of ‘x’.6 The derivation showing that
∃xFx ∧ ∃x¬Fx cannot be true is now blocked:
6 Formally, c = {〈1, 1〉, 〈1, 2〉, 〈2, 1〉, 〈2, 2〉, 〈3, 3〉, 〈3, 4〉, 〈4, 3〉, 〈4, 4〉}.
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1 ∈ J∃xFx ∧ ∃x¬FxKc iff (1, 1) ∈ J∃xFx,∃x¬FxKc
iff (d1, 1, 1) ∈ Jx, Fx,∃x¬FxKc, for some d1 ∈ D
iff (d1, d2, 1) ∈ Jx, x,∃x¬FxKc, d2 ∈ I(F ), for some d1, d2 ∈ D
iff (d1, d2, d3, 1) ∈ Jx, x, x,¬FxKc, d2 ∈ I(F ), for some d1, d2, d3 ∈ D
iff (d1, d2, d3, 0) ∈ Jx, x, x, FxKc, d2 ∈ I(F ), for some d1, d2, d3 ∈ D
iff (d1, d2, d3, d4) ∈ Jx, x, x, xKc, d2 ∈ I(F ) and d4 /∈ I(F ), for some d1, d2, d3, d4 ∈ D
Since coordination places the restriction that c(1, 2) and c(3, 4) the base clause
yields that
Jx, x, x, xKc = {〈d1, d2, d3, d4〉 | d1 = d2 ∧ d3 = d4}
=
{
(d1, d1, d2, d2) | d1, d2 ∈ D
}
and thus we can conclude that the formula is true
iff for some d1, d2 ∈ D, d ∈ I(F ) and d2 /∈ I(F ).
Thus, the sentence is true relative to the relevant coordinate scheme just in
case there exists an object which is F and a (possibly distinct) object which
is not F , which conforms to its meaning in more pedestrian semantics for
first-order logic.
3 Compositionality revisited
Where does this leave the antinomy? Recall that the puzzle was that (5)
and (6) semantically differ, even though they are minimal pairs differing only
by the substitution of synonyms ‘x’ and ‘y’. The relationist solution to the
puzzle conceded all of this, but denied compostionality, the principle that
if formulae (5) and (6) differ only by the substitution of constituents which
are semantically the same, then (5) and (6) are semantically the same.
But, as we have observed, the formulae Rxx and Rxy no longer differ in
themselves, but differ only when supplemented with a coordination scheme c
relating the occurrences of ‘x’ in Rxx. This coordination scheme may be an
additional component of the syntax or a parameter against which the formula
is evaluated. Thus, Fine effectively denies that (5) and (6) differ semantically
insofar as they are minimal pairs.
However, once supplemented with a coordination scheme c relating occur-
rences of ‘x’ in Rxx, there is a semantic difference. But the semantic difference
does not occur between minimal pairs. That is, (5) differs from (6) both by
substituting an occurrence of ‘x’ for ‘y’ and by having a distinct coordination
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scheme. We have to distinguish between ‘Rxx’ in which the occurrences of x
are coordinated from ‘Rxx’ in which the occurrences are not coordinated:
Rxx Rxx
The formula on the right does, while the formula left does not, form a minimal
pair with Rxy.7
Thus, by invoking enriched representation Fine does not solve the
antinomy by denying compositionality, but only by denying that the for-
mulae, insofar as they differ semantically, are minimal pairs. Indeed, the
semantics given above is weakly compositional on a standard construal. Weak
compositionality generally demands that if expressions φ and ψ differ in mean-
ing relative to index i, then either φ and ψ differ in structure or there are
corresponding subordinate expressions φ1 and ψ1 that differ in meaning rel-
ative to i. Treating the coordination schema as an index yields the following
principle of weak compositionality:
weak compositionality (with coordination): If φ = µ(φ1, . . . , φn)
and ψ = µ(ψ1, . . . , ψn) where each φi and ψi is a terminal syntactic con-
stituent and if φi and ψi are semantically the same for all i with respect to
c (that is, JφiKc = JψiKc or I(φi) = I(ψi)), then φ and ψ are semantically
the same with respect to c. (That is: JφKc = JψKc.)
The difference between the semantics enriched with coordination schema and
the mere relational semantics is this. In the relational semantics, two formulae
such as Rxx and Rxy give way to the sequence of variables (x, x) and (x, y),
respectively, where the semantic connections on these sequences are automat-
ically different even though the semantic connections on the variables taken
individually are the same. In the enriched semantics, however, the semantic
connections on the sequences (x, x) and (x, y) are the same, given the same co-
ordination scheme as input. It is only when different coordination schema are
taken as input that the sequences differ semantically. As a consequence, weak
compositionality is restored: the only way for two structurally isomorphic sen-
tences φ and ψ to differ semantically relative to a coordination scheme is if the
sequence of variables that each gives way to differs semantically relative to the
coordination scheme (or for their other vocabulary to different semantically).
Thus, the semantics of variables on offer provides no motivation for denying
weak compositionality, and Fine’s solution to the antinomy of the variable is
best understood as rejecting minimal pair. Thus, relationism becomes an
idle wheel in Fine’s solution to the antinomy. The formulae Rxx and Rxy
differ in meaning only when they are evaluated against distinct coordination
schema. The semantic connection on the sequences x, x and x, y plays no role
7 If we instead implement coordination as a parameter, we must distinguish between
evaluating Rxx against a scheme c which does not related the two occurrences of ‘x’ and a
scheme c∗ that does. If Rxx is evaluated at c, then it forms a minimal pair with Rxy. But if
it is evaluated at c∗, then the two formulas to not constitute a minimal pair, differing only
by the substitution of occurrences variables x for y.
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in generating this difference, except insofar as these sequences are themselves
evaluated against distinct schema. In the next section, we examine what lessons
can be drawn for Frege’s puzzle.
4 Relationism and Frege’s puzzle
Fine’s solution to Frege’s puzzle takes its cue from his solution to the antinomy
of the variable. We have seen two conflicting aspects to Fine’s solution to the
antinomy of the variable. One aspect is relationism, the semantic value of
a complex is determined not merely by the meanings of its constituents but
by relations among the constituents when taken in sequence. relationism,
thus formulated, is a denial of even weak compositionality. But—in the case of
variables—we saw that relationism does not generate a satisfactory seman-
tics. To repair the semantics, Fine introduces the other aspect, enriched rep-
resentation. The input to the semantic processing of a sentence is enriched
so that Rxx and Rxy no longer form a minimal pair. But, introducing en-
riched representation restores compositionality and thereby undermines
the case for relationism.
Fine’s solution to Frege’s puzzle, likewise vacillates between both these as-
pects. He explicitly advertises his solution to Frege’s puzzle as a rejection of
compositionality (Fine 2007: §2.B). On this view, even though the names
‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ agree in meaning (and occupy terminal nodes), the sen-
tences (1) ‘Cicero is Cicero’ and (2) ‘Cicero is Tully’ do not agree in meaning.
The explanation of this fact is meant to issue from relationism. Fine rejects
the following principle: “If the pairs of names ‘Cicero’, ‘Cicero’ and ‘Cicero’,
‘Tully’ are semantically different then so are the names ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully”’
(Fine 2007: 39). The semantics for sentences (1) and (2) will be evaluated in
terms of these sequences just as—in the relationist semantics for variables—
the semantics of Rxx and Rxy are evaluated in terms of the sequences (x, x)
and (x, y), respectively. But, as was the case with variables, Fine finds rea-
son to reject the view that coordination among the semantic values of two
occurrences of a name in a sentence arises solely from the fact that the name
occurs twice in the sentence. Rather, Fine’s semantics for names introduces
coordination schema as extra inputs to the semantic evaluation. Therefore,
his approach really should be taken as a denial of the claim that ‘Cicero is
Cicero’ and ‘Cicero is Tully’ constitute a minimal pair. In particular, they dif-
fer because they are assessed with respect to different parameters. We begin
by sketching how coordination among the semantic values of names in the
content of a sentence might be construed. We then examine why these coor-
dination relations are generated by enriched representation rather than
relationism. This better situates Fine’s solution within the space of existing
solutions to Frege’s puzzle.
16 Bryan Pickel, Brian Rabern
4.1 Coordination among names
Fine wants to explain the difference between (1) ‘Cicero is Cicero’ and (2) ‘Ci-
cero is Tully’ by appealing to the fact that the names may be coordinated in
the pair (‘Cicero’, ‘Cicero’) but not in the pair (‘Cicero’, ‘Tully’). The coordi-
nation of the variables in the pair (x, x) was accounted for by the the fact that
the pair can only assume values of the form 〈a, a〉. On the other hand, the lack
of coordination between the variables in the pair (x, y) was accounted for by
the fact that the pair can assume a value 〈a, b〉, where a 6= b. The resources of
the relationist semantics for variables, however, will need to be supplemented
to account for proper names. A name ‘Cicero’ or ‘Tully’ is capable of assuming
only one value: namely, its referent. So we cannot account for the difference
between the pair (‘Cicero’, ‘Cicero’) and the pair (‘Cicero’, ‘Tully’) merely by
assessing the different semantic connections, if this is construed as the set of se-
quences of values which the expressions can jointly assume.8 Rather, we need
to enrich the semantic connections to include additional information about
coordination.
Fine develops his theory in the context of the assumption that the semantic
content of a sentence is structured and that an occurrence of a name in the
sentence corresponds to the occurrence of the semantic value of the name in
the structured content. The particular implementation of this assumption is
flexible.9 As Fine (2007: 54) says: “All that matters is that we should be able
to talk meaningfully of the occurrences of an individual in a proposition and
that we should be able to talk meaningfully of substituting one individual for
another within a given proposition.” The connection between two occurrences
of a name will be represented by an additional connection between the values
of the occurrences of the value of name in the semantic value of the sentence.
We may think of the content of a sentence in this richer sense as a structured
meaning. The sentence is construed as a whole composed of occurrences of var-
ious subordinated expressions and the content of the sentence is construed as
a whole composed of occurrences of their values. Without representing coordi-
nation, the sentences (1) ‘Cicero is Cicero’ and (2) ‘Cicero is Tully’ will have
the same structured meanings since JCiceroK = JTullyK:
8 That is, unless names themselves are treated as variables (cf. Dever 1998 and Cumming
2008).
9 In fact, one could even implement coordination schema in a more or less “unstructured”
possible worlds framework. What matters is that relative to different coordination schema
‘Cicero is Cicero’ may be associated with different semantic values. Thus, semantic values
would need to be construed not as mere sets of possible worlds, but instead as worlds paired
with coordination information (e.g. tags and/or anchors of some sort). For example, the
multi-centered worlds approach of Ninan (2012) might be construed as a view along these
lines.
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JCiceroKJCiceroK
J=K
JTullyKJCiceroK
J=K
In order to represent that these are coordinated, lines will be drawn between
the relevant occurrences of JCiceroK and JTullyK in the structured meanings.
JCiceroKJCiceroK
J=K
JTullyKJCiceroK
J=K
Appealing to structured meanings provides the resources to describe the dif-
ference between the contents of (1) and (2). Now we need a semantic theory
to explain why these sentences have these different contents. We turn to this
issue in the next section.
4.2 The semantics of coordination
As we have mentioned, Fine advertises his semantic solution to Frege’s puzzle
as an implementation of the apparatus of semantic relationism. The semantic
difference between (1) ‘Cicero is Cicero’ and (2) ‘Cicero is Tully’ is meant to
arise because to the semantic difference between the pairs ‘Cicero’, ‘Cicero’
and ‘Cicero’, ‘Tully’ without there being a difference in the semantics of the
individual names.
A semantic difference between the identity sentences only strictly im-
plies a semantic difference between the pairs of names “Cicero”, “Ci-
cero” and “Cicero”, “Tully” but we may deny that the semantic differ-
ence between the pairs of names need imply a semantic difference be-
tween the names themselves. . . . “Cicero” is strictly coreferential with
“Cicero” but that “Cicero” is only accidentally (not strictly) coreferen-
tial with “Tully”. (Fine 2007: 51)
This type of view closely resembles a proposal in Putnam (1954) and Kaplan
(1990). As Putnam described the view, a necessary condition for synonymy is
intensional isomorphism (cf. Carnap 1947) which is equivalent to sameness of
structured meaning. But Putnam argued that synonymy requires more than
sameness of structured meaning. Rather, synonymy also requires agreement
in logical structure (Putnam 1954: 118), where “[t]wo sentences are said to
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have the same logical structure, when occurrences of the same sign in one
correspond to occurrences of the same sign in the other” (ibid.: footnote 8).
Although (1) and (2) result from synonymous expressions put together in the
same way, they nonetheless differ in logical structure, since ‘Cicero’ occurs
twice in (1) but only once in (2).10
Implementing this view in our framework, ‘Cicero is Cicero’ will correspond
to a structured meaning in which the nodes corresponding to the occurrence
of ‘Cicero’ are linked while ‘Cicero is Tully’ will correspond to a structured
meaning in which the nodes are not linked.
JCiceroKJCiceroK
J=K
JTullyKJCiceroK
J=K
So on this view, two nodes should be linked in the structured meaning of a
sentence just in case the corresponding positions are occupied by the same
term.
A semantic theory that assigns structured meanings unadorned with link-
ing relations to formulae is weakly compositional, any two sentences with the
same structure whose terminal nodes agree in meaning express the same un-
adorned structured meaning. However, a theory that assigns structured mean-
ings adorned with linking relations to formulae may fail to be compositional.
Two sentences that express different adorned structured meanings may re-
sult from composing corresponding expressions with the same semantic val-
ues in the same way. For it may assign distinct structured meanings adorned
with linking relations to ‘Cicero is Cicero’ and ‘Cicero is Tully’, though these
sentences agree in structure and their terminal constituents have the same
semantic values.
Putnam (1954) and Kaplan (1990), therefore, develop an account of what
a relationist solution to Frege’s puzzle would look like. But as with the case of
variables, Fine (2007: 41) rejects this solution. According to Fine coordination
between two occurrences of a name requires something more than mere recur-
rence of the name—just as coordination between two occurrences of a variable
10 Putnam (1954) insists that “. . . ‘Greek’ and ‘Hellene’ are synonymous. But ‘All Greeks
are Greeks‘ and ‘All Greeks are Hellenes’ do not feel quite like synonyms. But what has
changed? Did we not obtain the second sentence from the first by ‘putting equals for equals’?
The answer is that the logical structure has changed. The first sentence has the form ‘All
F are F ’, while the second has the form ‘All F are G’” (Putnam 1954: 118). Kaplan in a
similar vein states, “I have come to think that two sentences whose syntax—perhaps here I
should say, whose logical syntax—differs as much as ‘a = a’ differs from ‘a = b’ should never
be regarded as having the same semantic value (expressing the same proposition), regardless
of the semantic values of the individual lexical items ‘a’ and ‘b’” (Kaplan 1990: 95, footnote
6).
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requires something more than mere recurrence of the variable. This, in turn,
will serve as an additional input to semantic processing.
According to Fine, the linking relation in ‘Cicero is Cicero’
. . . cannot be a matter of having the same typographic name on the left
and the right [. . . ] nor can it be a matter of having the same name with
the same reference on the left and the right[.] Nor can it consist in the
names themselves being the same. (Fine 2007: 41)
The worries about mere typographic coincidence (or typographic coincidence
with accidental co-reference) being insufficient for coordination between to
uses of names are well-taken.
But Fine is explicit that the very same public language name may be
used on two occasions and fail to be coordinated. Fine considers Kripke’s
(1979) puzzling Peter who hears the common language name ‘Paderewski’ on
two different occasions, once when presented with a musician and once when
presented with a politician. Peter does not realize that the same word is used
to refer to the same man on both occasions. At one point, Peter comes to ask ‘is
Paderewski Paderewski?’. As Fine (2007: 111ff ) analyzes the situation, Peter’s
uses of the name ‘Paderewski’ are instances of the same public language word
‘Paderewski’. (Fine is explicit that they are coordinated with the same public
language expression.) That is, the same public language word recurs twice in
Peter’s question and its answer (7).
(7) Paderewski is Paderewski.
Yet, the two occurrences of the public language word ‘Paderewski’ in (7) can
fail to be coordinated. (So coordination is not Euclidean.)
What this means is that it cannot be a matter of the semantics of the public
language word ‘Paderewski’ that any two occurrences of it are coordinated. So
it cannot be a matter of semantics that (7) always expresses the coordinated
structured meaning:
JPaderewskiKJPaderewskiK
J=K
Analogously, Fine should think that it is not a matter of semantics that the
public language sentence (1) ‘Cicero is Cicero’ always expresses a structured
meaning in which the occurrences of the name ‘Cicero’ are coordinated.
Nonetheless, Fine (2007: 108-114) insists that it is a semantic matter that
certain uses of the public language sentence (1) ‘Cicero is Cicero’ express a
coordinated structured meaning while certain uses of (2) ‘Cicero is Tully’ do
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not express a coordinated structured meaning. But this means that coordina-
tion must come from something other than recurrence of the public language
names ‘Cicero’. Fine (ibid.: 89) denies that “context” supplies the missing in-
formation. But regardless of where it comes from it is an additional input to
the semantic processing.
Whether an utterance of the public language sentence (1) ‘Cicero is Ci-
cero’ expresses a coordinated content is not a function of the meaning of the
sequence of public language expressions ‘Cicero’, ‘is’, ‘Cicero’ on its own. The
meaning of an utterance of (1) depends on whether or not the two occurrence
of ‘Cicero’ are coordinated. Fine tells a story about when coordination hap-
pens. In particular, the two uses will be coordinated when a speaker takes
them to be be coordinated.
When two tokens of a given name are uttered by a single speaker, they
will be coordinated if and only if they are internally linked [i.e. just in
case the speaker takes them to have the same use]. (Fine 2007: 107)
So the meaning of a use of a public language sentence (1) ‘Cicero is Cicero’
is a function of the meaning of the sequence of public language expressions
‘Cicero’, ‘is’, ‘Cicero’ and also of what the speaker takes to be coordinated
with what. If the speaker does not take the occurrence of the public language
word to be coordinated, then the sentence does not express a coordinated
structured meaning.
But this means that insofar as (1) ‘Cicero is Cicero’ and (2) ‘Cicero is Tully’
differ in meaning, they are not minimal pairs differing only by the substitution
of proper names. They are evaluated against different coordination schema. To
put the matter differently, (1) is a minimal pair with (2), but also has the same
meaning. On the other hand, (1*) differs in meaning from (2), but these do
not constitute a minimal pair.
(1) Cicero is Cicero.
(1*) Cicero is Cicero.
(2) Cicero is Tully.
Fine would likely deny that the origin of the coordination in (1*) is a “syntac-
tic” matter. Rather, it arises from whether speakers take the two occurrences
to have the same use. We would construe this as a difference in context.11 Fine
(2007: 113) himself has a narrower conception of context. But he nonetheless
must concede that the input to the semantic evaluation in (1*) and (2) differs
by more than the mere substitution of proper names. There is only a threat to
11 Pinillos (2011) develops and modifies Fine’s idea by positing four axioms governing a
“semantic relation” between occurrences of expressions, which he calls ‘primitive linking’.
This relation is a “primitive relation from the perspective of a semantic theory” (ibid.: 322),
and thus, whether it is construed as a “contextual” parameter or not, will feature as an
additional input to semantics.
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compositionality if ‘Cicero is Cicero’ and ‘Cicero is Tully’ (under the intended
readings) are minimal pairs—all inputs to semantic evaluation must coincide.
But since the inputs to semantic evaluation differ by coordination schema, they
are not minimal pairs.12 Thus, compositionality is not threatened. Just as in
the variable case, relationism is an idle wheel. What explains the substitu-
tion failures is enriched representation, the coordination scheme, which
is an extra element of the semantic evaluation. And, just as in the variable
case, introducing additional inputs to the semantic evaluation reintroduces
compositionality.
5 Conclusion
Frege’s puzzle, recall, is that the substitution of coreferential names does not
seem to preserve meaning. We have by and large restricted our attention to the
substitution of coreferential names in simple sentences such as (1) and (2). As
we noted, the same puzzle arises from the substitution to coreferential names
in attitude ascriptions such as (3) ‘Sam believes that Cicero is Cicero’ and (4)
‘Sam believes that Cicero is Tully’. Construing Fine as denying minimal pair
situates his view among a larger class of views that reject this component of the
puzzle. For instance, hidden indexical theories (e.g., Crimmins and Perry 1989
and Schiffer 1992) would deny that insofar as they differ semantically, (3) and
(4) are minimal pairs differing only by the substitution of coreferential proper
names. According to the hidden indexical theory, the attitude ascriptions are
also assessed at different contexts, which leads to a difference in meaning. Fine
differs from the hidden indexical theory by locating the additional semantic
input in the simple sentence itself and not in an attitude ascription containing
it.13 But no matter how this additional semantic input is implemented to solve
Frege’s puzzle, there is no need to deny compositionality. As with the case of
the antinomy of the variable, Frege’s puzzle does not need to be taken as a
threat to this basic tenet of semantic theorizing.
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